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Paso. Periodically we received sets of case reports
from the three participating jurisdictions. We were given
a free hand to structure our analysis in our own way.
We constructed the code book' and implemented an
analysis.4 While we contributed our analysis of the
data, we did not participate in writing the Report.

Professor Ebbesen of the University of California,

Malpass: fIle illiois Filot Program study shows that

-

simultaneous lineups lead to more suspect identifications.

San Diego also agreed to serve as an analyst for the
Pilot Program. Professor Ebbesen and his research
group received the same case reports and constructed
their own way of coding and analyzing the data.
Professor Ebbesen's group and the Eyewitness Lab
at University of Texas at El Paso reached the same
conclusions, although our conventions for coding the
raw field reports for analysis differed in some respects,
leading to somewhat different numbers. Ebbesen and
Malpass never discussed anything about their task
had no conversation whatever - until they met during
the Symposium held at the Loyola University ofChicago
Law School on April 21, 2006.
Design
The study was designed to determine whether or
not a new eyewitness identification procedure (a
particular variant of double-blind sequential lineup) is
superior to the simultaneous lineup procedure in current
use. The specifics of implementation of the design are
discussed in the Report.6 This study was not the
extension of an academic research program and was
not undertaken to untangle theoretical issues.
Results
The major results are displayed in Table 1, for the
total sample, aggregating the results across the three
jurisdictions. There are three outcomes possible in this
study: suspect identifications, filler identifications and
non-identifications. It is important to note that suspect
identifications cannot be interpreted as either correct

Notes on the Illinois Pilot Program on
Sequential Double-Blind Identification
Procedures
Roy S. Malpass'
As a result ofrecommendations made by the Illinois
Governor's Commission on Capital Punishment, the
Illinois Legislature charged the Illinois State Police with
conducting a pilot program to evaluate the effectiveness
ofthe sequential, double blind identification procedure
in the field. Sheri H. Mecklenburg was appointed
Director of the Illinois Pilot Program and undertook
to design the Illinois Pilot Program, seeking comments
and approval from eyewitness researchers in the
process. Reporting forms were developed, police
personnel were given training on the new procedures
and procedures were developed for deciding which
lineups would be presented according to traditional or
new procedures. These matters and much more are
detailed in the Report to the Legislatureofthe State
oflllinois: the Bllinois Pilot Programon Sequential
Double-Blind Identification Procedures ("the
Report").2
The author was approached by Mecklenburg,
asking for our participation as analysts. I agreed to act
in this capacity with the assistance of Laura A.
Zimmerman, Stephen J. Ross, Lisa D. Topp, Vanessa
Uribe, Dannette De Leon, Sarah Ramirez and Jessica

Belisle, all members of the Eyewitness Identification
Research Laboratory at the University of Texas at El
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or false identifications, and non-identifications can not
be interpreted as missing the offender or as rejecting a
lineup that does or does not contain the actual offender.
It is not known, for any lineup in this study, whether
the suspect in the lineup is the actual offender. This
can be known in laboratory studies, but not in the field
without a considerable amount of additional research.
We will return to this matter below.
The major results are these:
(Malpass, continued on page 6)
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(Malpass, continuedfrom page 5)

a decrease in correct identifications in a culprit-present
lineup, then the sequential advantage for culprit-absent
lineups will be more than offset by the sequential
disadvantage for culprit-present lineups. This
comparison is worsened if one considers that culpritpresent lineups are probably the more frequent. It
seems implausible that on the average law enforcement
does not do better than a .5 probability of getting the
right person in the lineup.
Reasonable people can begin with different
assumptions, however. The proportions of suspect
identifications contributed to correct and false
identifications can be argued, and various probabilities
that the culprit is actually in the lineup can be
entertained.
Stability of the findings across jurisdictions is a
matter of interest from the perspective of application.
These findings are displayed in Table 2.

Table 1. Effects of Simultaneous and Sequential
Lineups on Three Outcome Variables.
n=548

*

*

*

Simultaneous(319) Sequential(229)

Suspect ID 59.9%

45%

Filler ID

2.8%

9.2%

No ID

37.6%

47.2%

Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup
identified the suspect more often than those
witnesses who viewed a sequential lineup (suspect
identification rates of 59.9 percent and 45 percent
respectively).
Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup chose
a filler less often than those who viewed a sequential
lineup (filler identification rates of 2.8 percent and
9.2 percent respectively).
Witnesses who viewed a simultaneous lineup were
less likely to choose no one than were those who
viewed a sequential lineup (no identification rates
of 37.6 percent and 47.2 percent respectively).

*

Forsimultaneous lineups, suspect identifications
vary over a range of 10.7 points, from 57.0 to
67.7, and non-identifications vary over a range of
10.1 points, from 32.3 to 42.4.
* Forsequentiallineups, suspect identifications vary
over a range of 42.7 points, from 25.9 to 68.6,
and non-identifications vary over a range of 34.4
points, from 28.6 to 63.0
* The difference between simultaneous and
sequential lineups also varies considerably, from
+ 41.8 to -7.3.
Sequential lineups appear to be more sensitive to
differences in jurisdiction / location / context
background conditions, although it is not clear exactly
what conditions these might be.
/

As noted above, these results cannot be interpreted
directly as accurate or erroneous responses.
Nonetheless, assuming that the increase in nonidentifications for sequential lineups compared with
simultaneous lineups reflects a proportionate increase
in correct rejections in a culprit-absent lineup, and that
the decrease in suspect identifications from
simultaneous to sequential lineups is proportionate with

(Malpass, continued on page 7)

Table 2: Effects of Simultaneous and Sequential Lineups on Three Outcome Variables, by Jurisdiction.
Chicago

Evanston

Joliet

Sim.

Seq.

Sim.

Seq.

Sim.

S eq.

Suspect ID

57

43.1

67.7

25.9

61.3

68.6

FillEr ID

0.7

10.2

0

11.1

5.8

2.9

42.4

48.5

32.3

63

33.6

28.6

No ID
Summer 2006
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Discussion and Interpretation
The Illinois Pilot Program' is a landmark eyewitness
identification study, even among field studies:
*

*
*
*

It has to be said that not much good
news will be found in the Illinois Pilot
The Illinois Pilot Program makes a direct comProgram for those who advocate separison between the traditional, intact simulattaneous lineup procedures and a version of quential lineups to law enforcement
and governmental organizations.
double-blind sequential lineups.

It uses multiple jurisdictions.
It contains more than 700 individual identifications.
The criminal cases cover the entire range of
crimes committed during the period of the
study.

Field data are inherently noisy. Field studies are
known for variability, and this is why laboratory studies
are sometimes called "controlled" studies by way of
contrast. There are many investigators, many contexts
and many jurisdictions, and these lead to many
variations in implementation. In some respects the noisy
background may obscure relationships in the data that
might be found under otherwise more controlled
conditions. On the other hand, strong effects showing
through the background variation would be robust.
Additionally, confounding factors outside of the
research design proposed as having an effect on study
outcomes would also have to be strong (substantial
empirical effect size), consistent and detectable to be
taken seriously. Further, the noisy study environment
is a valid reflection of the environment of application
because it IS the environment of application.
It may take some time to frame new questions
arising out of our attempts to interpret these results.
The questions will lead to new and more informative
research - certainly in the laboratory - and hopefully in
field studies carried out in association with law
enforcement. This is a very rich intellectual welfare
program for researchers.
Clearly the problems with eyewitness identifications
have not been solved, and as Barry Scheck pointed
out in his remarks on the eve of the Loyola Conference,
we should move forward to develop other areas of
lineup reform while we clarify the contribution of
sequential lineup presentation. Working relationships

between law enforcement and academic researchers
should be strengthened to study a range of identification
questions.'
Transposition from field categories to the
categories of laboratory studies. An important thing
to note in the interpretive process is that the three
outcome categories of the field study cannot easily
be disaggregated into the six (at least) categories of
laboratory studies.
It would be possible to disaggregate the field study
categories under two conditions: If we make
assumptions about (1) the proportions of each field
category to be distributed to each of the two cognate
lab categories, and (2) the proportion of those figures
to be considered, reflecting the aprioriprobability of
the suspect being the perpetrator, or not.
Filler Identifications. Filler identifications are the only
responses that have an apparent clear interpretation.
The only thing that can be said, really, is that sequential
lineups attract a non-trivially greater frequency of filler
identifications, overall. This is descriptively true for all
three jurisdictions, but statistically reliable for only two.
The absolute percentage offiller identifications is small.
There does not appear to me to be a theoretically solid
way to use this result to make inferences about the
interpretation of the real interest of this study: the
accuracy of suspect identifications and nonidentifications.
Double-blind simultaneous lineups as a comparison.
The purpose of the study, as stated above, was to
determine whether or not a new eyewitness
identification procedure (a particular variant ofdouble(Malpass, continued on page 8)
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Figure 1. Transitions from Field Outcome Categories to Laboratory Outcome Categories.'
Laboratory Studies
Suspect = Perp

Suspect # Perp

Cofrect I D 4

--

Filler 10

False ID
10. Filler ID

No ID

No ID
Field Studies
"-"

L

Suspect ID

4"

Filer10

blind sequential lineup) is superior to the simultaneous
lineup procedure in current use. However, there are
some nuances to the question.
First, to evaluate the effects of a change in practice
against existing practice is a completely appropriate
research strategy. To have changed the existing
simultaneous lineup practice for purposes of
comparison against a new practice would have given
no guidance to law enforcement at the end of the study
because it would have had little to do with their current
practice. This was a simple and straightforward study
design for a straightforward question.
Second, perhaps there is an interest in the ultimate
question of whether some version of a double-blind
sequential presentation is superior to some version of
a double-blind simultaneous presentation. That is a
different question, and it is not the one asked in the
Illinois Pilot Program. To answer that question would
require different research design strategies. But more
than that, it would place law enforcement agencies in
Illinois in the position of doing research to answer our
(academic researchers) questions rather than their
own. I would like it very much if I could establish the
Field Study Unit of the Eyewitness Identification
Research Laboratory within the law enforcement

community of the State of Illinois, but this project
could not serve in that capacity.
The comparison between blind sequential and
non-blind simultaneous lineups is confounded. A
confounded comparison exists when there is at least
one difference between two research conditions in
addition to the difference introduced for study. In
the Illinois Pilot Program, sequential lineups are
uniquely blind while simultaneous lineups are uniquely
not blind. So there are two factors (at least)
differentiating them: mode ofpresentation and blind
vs. not blind. The question is to what degree the
blind vs. not blind difference hinders interpretation
of the presentation mode difference. On the one
hand, confounded comparisons are the rule for field
studies, and when the very powerful research
strategies possible with true experiments are not
present, investigators are left with trying to reason
their way through the interpretation of observed
differences. Un-confounding requires that the
important factors are known and either controlled
or measured for post-hoc analysis. There may be
many confounding factors in this study with effects
that cannot be anticipated or estimated. It was not
possible to monitor the administration of even a
(Malpass, continued on page 39)
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presented sequentially than they make from lineups
presented simultaneously.6 As a consequence, both
fillers and "suspects" are identified less often in
sequential compared to simultaneous lineups. Based
on these findings, some researchers have advocated
that policy makers adopt sequential over simultaneous
lineups to minimize the potential for eyewitnesses to
mistakenly identify innocent suspects. Unfortunately,
research has not adequately addressed whether
adopting a sequential procedure in practice would also
reduce the rate at which guilty suspects are identified.
If the results of laboratory studies can be generalized
The Illinois Pilot Progran data may show evidence of
investiator influence and eyewitness bias, including racial
to witness responses in actual criminal cases, both filler
bias.
and suspect choice rates should decrease as a result
of moving from a simultaneous to a sequential lineup
In Response to the Illinois Pilot Program procedure.

on Simultaneous v. Sequential Lineups'
Ebbe B. Ebbesen and Kristin M. Finklea

Summary of Major Findings from the Pilot
Program

To assess these predictions, we can look at the
The true level of eyewitness accuracy in the legal results from the Illinois Pilot Program (Table 1). The
system has been debated by researchers and entire sample contained a total of 367 different cases,
laypersons alike. Specifically, inaccurate eyewitness in which researchers identified a total of 741 lineups.
identification is thought, by some, to be the primary Of these, a total of521 uniquelineups were identified,
cause of false convictions.' The goal ofthe legal system as some investigators presented the same suspect in
is to maximize the number of convicted guilty suspects the same position with the same fillers to more than
while minimizing (and, in theory, eliminating) the number one witness. Across three jurisdictions investigators
of convicted innocent suspects. To minimize the rate conducted a total of 366 standard simultaneous, singleofmistaken identifications, researchers have suggested suspect lineups and a total of 271 sequential, doublethat eyewitness identification evidence be collected blind, single-suspect lineups. Witness/victims chose the
using modified lineup procedures. Two of the major suspect in 244 (or 67 percent) of all ofthe simultaneous
changes in protocol include: 1) using blind lineup lineups and in 154 (or 57 percent) of the sequential/
administrators and 2) displaying the lineup photographs blind lineups. Witness/victims chose fillers a total of 8
sequentially.' In order to effect policy change in a times (or 2.2 percent) when viewing the simultaneous
scientifically reasonable manner, researchers should lineups and 18 times (or 6.6 percent) when viewing
compare a proposed new policy against the established sequential lineups (the difference in choice rates
policy already in place. Without this comparison, we between the simultaneous and sequential lineup
will never know whether the new policy is any better procedures was statistically significant). Including
than the old. Such a comparison is no different than multiple suspect lineups in the analysis did not change
that used in the medical field to evaluate the the basic pattern of results. Thus, overall, the suspect
effectiveness of a new treatment against the current choice rate was higher and the filler choice rate was
method. The Illinois Pilot Program was designed lower for the simultaneous than sequential lineup
utilizing this philosophy to compare the proposed procedure.
sequential double-blind lineup procedure against the
The tendency for witnesses to choose suspects
traditional simultaneous (non-blind) lineup procedure. more frequently and fillers less frequently given a
To date, findings from laboratory research suggest
that witnesses make fewer selections from lineups

9 J.Public Interest Law Reporter
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Table 1: Number and Percent of Suspect and Filler Choices for Known Single Suspect Lineups
as a Function of Lineup Procedure
Lineup
Procedure

Number of Choices
Suspects
Fillers

Simultaneous
Sequential

244
154

No
Choice

8
18

simultaneous compared to a sequential lineup
presentation was replicated for two of the three
jurisdictions, Chicago and Evanston. In Chicago,
suspects were chosen 64 percent of the time with
simultaneous lineups and 49.5 percent ofthe time with
sequential lineups. In addition, no fillers were chosen
with simultaneous lineups, but with sequential lineups
6.3 percent of the choices were of fillers. Similarly, in
Evanston, suspects were chosen 72.1 percent of the
time with simultaneous lineups and 44.2 percent of the
time with sequential lineups. Again, no fillers were
chosen with simultaneous lineups, but 13.5 percent of
the choices in sequential lineups were fillers. In Joliet,
the pattern was slightly different. The suspect choice
rates were 61.7 percent for simultaneous and 69.4
percent for sequential lineups, with filler choice rates
at 4.4 percent and 6.5 percent, respectively. In
summary, across all three jurisdictions, the known error
rate (i.e. foil identifications) was higher with sequential
than simultaneous lineups, and suspect choice rates
were higher in simultaneous than sequential lineups for
two out of three of the jurisdictions. It is clear that the
results from this field program are in direct contradiction
to the generalizations from laboratory research
findings.
Alternative Explanations for the Findings
Two different classes ofexplanations might account
for the differences in the pattern of results seen in the
field project and that in laboratory simulations. We
can focus on the differences in how lineups are
constructed in laboratory research and how they are
typically constructed in the legal system. Alternatively,
we can focus on the fact that the two lineup procedures
differed not only in terms of the presentation of lineup
"altematives" (simultaneously v. sequentially) but also
Summer 2006
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/4

114
99

Percent of Total Choices
Suspect
Filler
No
Choice
66.7
56-8

2_2
6.6

31-1
36.5

in terms of whether the investigators conducting the
lineups knew the suspect's location in the lineup.
Lineup Construction
The discrepancy between the Illinois Pilot Program9
results and the laboratory findings can be explained
by considering that the characteristics of the lineups
employed in the field might have differed from the
characteristics of the lineups employed in the
laboratory. First, the base rate of guilty suspects
appearing in lineups might have been higher in the field
compared to laboratory studies. In order to accurately
assess the generalizability of laboratory research to
eyewitness identifications in actual criminal cases,
researchers should evaluate the true rate of target
present ("TP") and target absent ("TA") lineups. 0 In
the typical laboratory study, there are equal
proportions, 50:50, of TP and TA lineups. However,
researchers have yet to determine if this proportion is
representative of the rate at which guilty and innocent
suspects appear in actual lineups. The burden of
suspect choice errors is often overlooked in applied
research, assuming that suspect equals culprit. The
most problematic error an eyewitness can make is that
of selecting an innocent suspect (not that of selecting a
known-innocent foil) from a lineup. Some have
concluded that in the laboratory, the largest difference
in identification outcomes across the two lineup
procedures occurs in the identification of "innocent"
compared to "guilty" suspects." That is, although both
guilty and innocent suspects are chosen more often in
simultaneous lineups, the difference found in innocent
suspect identifications is larger.'" Therefore, some
have suggested that switching to a sequential lineup
will reduce innocent suspect choices more than guilty
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedonpage 11)
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(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedfrompage 10)
suspect choices. However, if guilty suspects are
present in real world lineups more often than are
innocent suspects, using a sequential lineup procedure
will suppress the hit rate more than the false alarm rate
in actual cases. As such, the higher rate of suspect
choices in simultaneous compared to sequential lineups
conducted in Illinois may have resulted from the fact
that the large majority of suspects presented to
witnesses for identification were actually guilty culprits
rather than innocent suspects.
Second, the relatively low rate of filler choices in
actual lineups compared to laboratory studies might
be explained by the difference in the way fillers are
selected for actual lineups compared to lineups
constructed in a laboratory. In a typical controlled
experiment, the guilty suspect is removed and replaced
with an innocent look-alike. Foils, consequently,
remain high in similarity to both the guilty (TP) and
innocent (TA) suspects. In the real world, however,
an innocent suspect who is apprehended may look
nothing like the actual culprit. Hence, when foils are
selected for the lineup based on their degree ofsimilarity
to the innocent suspect, these foils will have a high
degree of similarity to the innocent suspect, but a low
degree of similarity to the actual culprit. As a result, a
witness may be less likely to select a foil from such a
TA lineup than a lineup containing the culprit. This
could explain why the filler choice rates are so much
lower in the Illinois Pilot Programl3 than in laboratory
studies.
Investigator Bias
i) Conditions that Might Suppress or
Enhance Investigator Bias
Based on the observed difference in choice rates
between the data from the Illinois Pilot Programl 4 and
the predictions grounded in laboratory research, we
wanted to examine whether specific variables that might
make it easier or harder for investigators to influence
witness choices (in the non-blind simultaneous lineup)
had the predicted effects on choice rates. One such
variable is the relationship that existed between the
witness and the suspect prior to the crime. One might
expect witnesses who knew the suspect prior to the
crime would be more difficult for investigators to

11 | Public Interest Law Reporter
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influence than witnesses who were attempting to identify
a stranger. Therefore, not only should strangers be
identified less often than acquaintances (regardless of
lineup procedure), but the investigators conducting
simultaneous lineups should be able to influence
witnesses to pick the suspect more often and the fillers
less often when the suspect and witness were strangers.
This should not occur with blind, sequential lineups.
We examined the prior relationship predictions in
photo lineups, as most live lineups contained stranger
relationships. With simultaneous photo lineups, 90.3
percent of the witnesses chose the suspect when a
prior relationship existed but only 53.6 percent chose
the suspect when they were strangers. With sequential
photo lineups, these percentages were 76.3 percent

[A] cross all three jurisdictions, the
known error rate (i.e. foil identifications)
was higher with sequential than
simultaneous lineups, and suspect
choice rates were higher in simultaneous
than sequential lineups for two out of

three of the jurisdictions. It is clear that
the results from this field program are
in direct contradiction to the
from laboratory
generalizations
research findings.

and 43.8 percent respectively. Thus, the difference in
choice rates between sequential (blind and no
influence) and simultaneous (with influence) lineups was
larger for the acquaintance choices (76.3 percent v.
90.3 percent) than for the stranger choices (43.8
percent v. 53.6 percent), exactly opposite to
prediction.
Considering filler choices from simultaneous photo
lineups, none of the witnesses or victims chose a filler
when a prior relationship existed; but, 1.3 percent of
the witness/victims chose a filler when they were
strangers. With sequential photo lineups, these
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedonpage 12)
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(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedfrompage 11)
percentages were 2.6 percent and 9.4 percent
respectively. As expected, fillers were chosen more
often when a "stranger" relationship existed in both
lineup types, but were investigators who conducted
simultaneous lineups better able to influence witnesses
to avoid choosing fillers in stranger lineups (compared
to acquaintance lineups) than were investigators who
conducted sequential lineups? The shift from sequential
to simultaneous lineups caused a small decrease (from
2.6 percent to 0) in filler choices when the suspect
was an acquaintance but a bigger decrease (from 9.4
percent to 1.3 percent) when the suspect was a
stranger. These results are consistent with the
investigator bias explanation.
Consequently, although the filler choice rates for
strangers and acquaintances might be explained by
investigator bias, the suspect choice rates are
inconsistent with this hypothesis. Since the investigator
influence hypothesis assumes that investigators would
be simultaneously directing witnesses away from fillers
and towards suspects, the pattern of results seems
inconsistent with the investigator bias explanation.
We also analyzed whether the status of witnesses
(as a victim of the criminal act or simply a witness to
the action) had any effect of choice rates. Because
the consequences of making a choice are different for
the two types of witnesses, we might expect those
who were victims of the crime to be more likely to
make a selection purely for the sake of conviction.
Investigators could take advantage of this tendency
when they know who the suspect is in the lineup, an
argument for a potential benefit of instituting a
(sequential) double-blind procedure. If so, we may
expect victims to be less likely to select foils and more
likely to choose suspects, but only when presented

with the simultaneous procedure - a procedure in which
the investigators knew who the suspect was. Results
ofthe analysis are inconsistent with this view. Given a
simultaneous lineup procedure, victims and witnesses
selected suspects at equal rates (63.49 percent and
67.69 percent, respectively) and chose fillers at equal
rates (2.07 percent, 1.83 percent). The same pattern
held in sequential lineups for victims and witnesses
selecting suspects (51.17 percent, 53.96 percent) and
fillers (8.72 percent, 6.47 percent). In essence, the
effect of lineup procedure on choice rates was
unchanged for victims and witnesses.
ii) Witness Confidence
The double-blind procedure was included in the
Illinois Pilot Program," in part, because researchers
have suggested that without it, there is a possibility
that investigators may consciously or inadvertently
influence witness selections from a lineup.1 6 Were this
to happen, we might expect those witnesses who
agreed with the investigator to be more confident that
they were right in selecting the suspect (the same person
the investigator believed was guilty) and less confident
when they disagreed with the investigator and selected
a filler. To examine this notion, we first analyzed suspect
and filler choice rates as a function of the confidence
that witnesses expressed in their identifications (Table
2). Confidence could be assessed for 31 percent of
the simultaneous lineups and 63 percent of the
sequential lineups based on the investigators' written
assessments ofwitness confidence at the time the lineup
identification was conducted. High and moderate
confidence choices were more associated with higher
suspect choice rates than were low confidence choices.
Moderate and low confidence choices were associated
(Ebbesen/Finklea, continuedon page 27)

Table 2. Number and Percent of Suspect and Filler Choices as a Function of Expressed
Confidence for all Lineups with Known Suspect Structure
Confidence
High
Moderate
Low
Not Known

Number of Choices
Suspect
Filler
7
186
32
9
7
4
204
12

Summer 2006
http://lawecommons.luc.edu/pilr/vol11/iss2/4

No Choice
64
2
18
174

Percent of Choices
Suspect
Filler
72-4
2.7
74.4
20.9
24.1
13.8
52-3
31
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The Street, The Lab, The Courtroom, blind, sequential routines with apparent success. Even
so, the Guide did place the burden of proving the
The Meeting Room
James M. Doyle', Steven Penrod, Ph.D.,
Margaret Bull Kovera, Ph.D. and Jennifer
Dysart, Ph.D.
The Mecklenburg Report 2 documenting the results
of the Illinois Pilot Program on Sequential DoubleBlind Identification Procedures will frustrate the most
violent partisans on both sides of the debate over the
future of eyewitness investigations.
Sadly, the Mecklenburg Report will also disappoint
a broad audience of practitioners in the middle that
hoped for guidance-for something to do (or avoid
doing) to minimize the number ofimprisoned innocents
and untouched criminals that the DNA exoneration
cases warn us eyewitness memory can produce. The
Mecklenburg Report represents a taxing effort, its
author and the participating officers and departments
deserve our thanks, but the Report does not succeed
in combining the perspectives ofthe street investigator,
the laboratory scientist and the courtroom litigator into
a working synthesis. In the Report's aftermath, it is
clearer than ever that all three perspectives, their
potentials and their limitations must be recognized
before there can be a basis for action informed by
science.
If the Mecklenburg Report convinces the criminal
justice system's practitioners-investigators,
prosecutors, defenders and judges-that they cannot
wait around for legislatures to act, but must get
themselves to the table together, engage the scientists,
and work to find answers, then it can be a positive
contribution. But until that happens, the Mecklenburg
Report will leave us not far from where we were when
the National Institute ofJustice issued its path-breaking
Eyewitness Evidence: A Guide for Law
Enforcement3 ("the Guide") in 1999. We still have a
substantial body of laboratory results arguing for the
procedures that the Guide identified as good (pre-lineup instructions), or good but not preferred (sequential
lineup display), or simply potential (double-blind)
options. We now have a number of satisfied
jurisdictions around the country (including New Jersey,
Boston and Minneapolis) that have instituted double-

superiority of those procedures in operation on their
advocates, and the Mecklenburg Report's numbers
certainly do not lighten that burden. In fact, at least on
the surface, the Report's numbers seem to tend in the
opposite direction: against innovation. But if we look
beneath the surface, we find that even ifthe numerical
results noted in the Mecklenburg Report's field study
had been reversedthe Report still would not have
proved the superiority of double-blind sequential
procedures. The Mecklenburg Report reveals a study
that simply was not set up to test under scientific control
either double-blind, or sequential procedures. Nor
did it test scientifically any differences between blind
and not-blind simultaneous procedures.
These gaps are doubly unfortunate because five
years from now we will not be handling eyewitness
identifications in the same way that we handle them
now. Our arrays of dog-eared mug shots and hastily
improvised station house lineups are certain to be
supplemented-and are almost certainly doomedby a digital revolution that promises us quick, cheap,
convenient and comprehensively documented
identification procedures. We will have-some
departments now have-photo lineup capability on
laptops in squad cars. The capacity to present photoarrays on Palm Pilots has already been studied in the
labs. There soon will be many alternatives to dragging
victims to the precinct house in the middle of the night
and hiring line-up fillers from the homeless shelters in
order to test witness memory.
But to say we will have new equipment doesn't tell
us what we should do with it. What should we show
the witnesses on our laptops? "Sequential" displays?
How should we show it? With "double-blind"
techniques? What is the best procedure for the future?
The Mecklenburg Report does not really answer these
questions; in fact, the study it recounts does not really
ask them.
In hindsight it is clear that the Mecklenburg Report
reveals a crippling misunderstanding at the heart ofthe
field study it describes.
The Illinois Legislature issued a directive to pursue
a specific goal: compare a traditional technique of
eyewitness evidence gathering (the "simultaneous"
(Doyle, continued on page 14)
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(Doyle, continuedfrom page 13)
display of suspect and fillers by an officer who is aware
ofwhich lineup member is the suspect) with a proposed
improvement (the "sequential" display of suspect and
fillers by a "double-blind" administrator). But the
Mecklenburg Report is pervaded by an unexplained
determination to treat the Legislature's statement of a
goal as if it dictated a method. The failure to
acknowledge the distinction between goal and method
affected not only the Report on the study, but the design
of the study itself, and it imposed serious handicaps.
The muddle of method and goal explains why, in the
words of United States Attorney Patrick Fitzgerald,
the study "raises more questions than it answers."In faimess to the Illinois Legislature, it did what it
could to signal that the studies of eyewitness
procedures that should be conducted were not the
crude "traditional v. double-blind sequential" test the
Mecklenburg Report describes. The Legislature sought
an empirical answer to an empirical question by the
use of study instruments: "[D]esigned to elicit
information for comparative evaluation purposes, and
...
consistent with objective scientific research
methodology."' An appropriate objective scientific
research methodology exists, but the Mecklenburg
Report shows plainly that the study it discusses stopped
short of applying that methodology.
Four psychologists are mentioned prominently in
the Mecklenburg Report. Two, (Dr. Nancy Steblay
and Dr. Gary Wells) are bitterly critical of the report
and allege that their participation is exaggerated by
the Report's author; two (Dr. Ebbe Ebbesen and Dr.
Roy Malpass) consider the Mecklenburg Report on
the field study to be a valuable document. But all
four of these scientists disclaim any responsibility for
designingthe study. In fact, the study, like the Report,
is the product of a single hard-working lawyer for the
Chicago Police without formal training in social science
methods. The differences between legal and social
science practice show. For example, the Report
describes as "random" assignment methods which in
the legal world might be accepted as meriting the term,
but which no social scientist would recognize as true
random assignment. The result of this absence of a
science-based design is that the Mecklenburg Report
forfeits lessons that a truly scientific approach might
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have taught. Because the requirements of scientific
methodology were not imposed in the design of the
study, we now know much less than we could.
To begin with, a comparison of the new "doubleblind sequential" photo arrays with traditional
"simultaneous, not-blind" lineups, which merely lays
the two side-by-side, could never have been
informative in any scientific way. To properly assess
the "sequential" photo-arrays against "simultaneous"
procedures either both "simultaneous" and "sequential"
would have to be "not-blind," or both would have to
be double-blind-only then could we gauge which
factor was creating the effect we see. To properly
weigh the impact of "double-blind" procedures both
simultaneous and sequential procedures would have
to be run in "double-blind" and"not-blind" conditions

The Mecklenburg Report speaks for
many when it suggests that we expand
our inquiries and address further questions. But, real improvements in justice
system processes based on science will
only occur if cops, prosecuors and defenders take responsibility for framing
the right questions informed from the
beginning by scientific advice.
before the impact of "blindness" on investigations could
be assessed. In other words, a fatal "confound" is
built into the design ofthe Report, making it impossible
as a matter ofmethod, to retrieve authoritative answers
to the question the Legislature posed.
Besides, treating the question posed by the
Legislature as a methodological directive while ignoring
the Legislature's wish that "scientific methodologies"
govern the study hopelessly entangled the operational
issues of what is feasible on the street or in the precinct
with the reliability research issue of whether the new
procedures are worth doing in the first place.
For operational purposes it was natural for the
Report to use "suspect hits" as a proxy for "correct
identifications." A radical decline in "suspect hits" in
(Doyle, continued on page 15)
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did this happen? What does it mean? Unfortunately,
the design of the study and the Mecklenburg Report's
double-blind sequential procedures would indicate at recounting of it leave open a quite simple and obvious
least in a rough and ready way a very awkward explanation: the failure to account for a fundamental
disconnect between that particular identification difference between lab life and street life.
technique and police field operations. But it is important
When the lab scientists study the efficacy of an
to confine the "suspect hit" criteria to its operational identification technique, the single "simultaneous" or
significance. Obviously, ifwe were satisfied with every "sequential" test they scrutinize is almost always the
procedure that yields a 100 percent rate of "suspect witness'sfirst attempt at the identification ofa strangerhits" we would never have undertaken the enterprise perpetrator. This places the focus on the most influential
in the first place; we would have simply agreed to (and therefore dangerous) encounter, but it does not
regard the dozens of DNA exonerations (every one of automatically duplicate typical real-life practice; in real
them based on a "suspect hit" which seemed life a witness's live line-up performance is only one
"corroborated") and the dozens of active criminals who episode in the witness's career in the criminal justice
escaped justice in those cases as an inevitable cost of system. In real life-and in the experience of the
doing business. "Suspect hits" can tell us important witnesses depicted in the Mecklenburg Report-a
things about operations, but-even in the Hennepin "live" lineup experience can be (in most places, usually
County field study, where the results were radically is) preceded by a show-up, a "drive-by", or by a
different from those recited in two of the three photo-array. To treat the rate of suspect identifications
Mecklenburg Reportjurisdictions -they tell us very attained in first attempts in laboratories and third
little about the reliability questions at the heart of the attempts in the field (by witnesses who were, in effect,
issue of procedural superiority.
pre-tested on a show-up and a photo-array) as
Lab methods have their own limitations, and there equivalent doesn'tjust compare apples to oranges; it
is a danger ofunintentionally imposing those limitations compares apples to automobiles. It isn't particularly
if we undertake "lab-like" studies in the field.
surprising ifthird attempts by pre-tested witnesses (i.e.,
The specific limitation that concerns us here is not after two successful attempts and the dismissal of all
the worry that in the real world crime situation human of the unsuccessful witnesses) to identify a suspect in
memory operates in a qualitatively different way. There the field lead to fewer "filler ID's."
is no evidence for that fear. In studies pre-dating the
We don't know from the Mecklenburg Report that
Report, the rate of"filler ID's" in the lab and in the real this happened, but unfortunately we can't know that it
world seemed to match up fairly closely. In the didn 't happen, because the witnesses' history in the
occasional hyper-realistic laboratory study, such as Dr. investigation is not recorded or reported. The
Charles Morgan's controlled study of special forces Mecklenburg Report treats the field results as if they
troops who were asked to identify their interrogators were the lab results, but the study under examination
after a high stress interrogation (more than half identified did not follow the scientific tradition of recording
a "filler" in conventional simultaneous arrays) the results, experimental data, and so it failed to capture data that
again, are consistent with both the more conventional the lab would have noted as a matter of routine
lab setting experiments and with the scattered field experimental design. How many of these eyewitnesses
results from the United States and the United identified fillers in initial field procedures? How many
Kingdom.' But even while we acknowledge that the of these were filtered out of the process before the
lab studies and the field studies are examining the same subsequent, reported lineups? How many witnesses
processes of human memory, we have to remember in the subsequent lineups were performing a
that they do so in different contexts.
confirming recognition task following a successful
The Mecklenburg Report's most intriguing results suspect identification in a show-up or an array? Either
are its account of a "zero" rate of filler identifications of these features is at least as likely to have affected
in two ofthree jurisdictions. These results are unique the suspect/filler identification rates as might wholesale
among existing studies in the lab and in the field. How
(Doyle, continued on page 16)
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police "tipping" ofwitnesses by police. (Although the
Mecklenburg Report persistently invokes the straw
man of sinister allegations ofpolice misconduct, in fact
no one claims either that intentional police misconduct
is the problem in the DNA eyewitness exoneration
cases, or that if it were the problem, procedural reforms
would be a silver-bullet solution to all intentional
"framing" of suspects.) If people are cheating, they
will continue to cheat, whatever procedures are
adopted. But, as things now stand we are provided
with no authoritative refutation of dark speculations
about of police "tipping" because a wide range of
data points-for example, the number of "low
confidence" filler identifications and the number of
failures to identify-were not captured in the study's
design.
Operations and reliability are muddled in a different
way when the "double-blind" technique is at issue. If
"double-blind" procedures add something to accuracy,
then implementing double-blind procedures-as
jurisdictions in Wisconsin, Massachusetts, New Jersey
and elsewhere have done-becomes a question of
police ingenuity, commitment and leadership in
surmounting operational challenges. But, if we ask
the police their opinion of the "double-blind" approach
before they are persuaded that it can contribute to
accuracy, the police can't be blamed for accepting
inconvenience and unfamiliarity as sufficient answer.
Besides, when the police are not invited to participate
in the design ofthe specific local double-blind sequential
technique but are simply presented with a "take it or
leave it" version in informal oral training an opportunity

The Mecklenburg Report represents a
taxing effort, its author and the participating officers and departments deserve
our thanks, but the Report does not suc-

ceed in combining the perspectives of
the street investigator, the laboratory
scientist and the courtroom litigator into

a working synthesis.

to confuse the performance is created and an
opportunity to exploit police expertise is lost.
The Mecklenburg Report speaks for many when it
suggests that we expand our inquiries and address
further questions. But, real improvement injustice
system processes based on science will only occur if
the cops, prosecutors and defenders take responsibility
for framing the right questions informed from the
beginning by scientific advice. The system's
practitioners not only have to take responsibility for
integrating science into practice; they have to take
responsibility for doing it together.
This will cause some discomfort. The Mecklenburg
Report documents a field study that followed the more
normal course ofreform efforts within the system: One
actor or another is charged with (or pro-actively
assumes) responsibility for mobilizing one scientific
advance or another, chooses its own scientists, closely
holds the information developed and makes (or
foregoes) reforms. This is not the only way.
Behind their adversarial routines, all criminal justice
practitioners share a common enemy-the innocent
defendant. No one wants the innocent in the system.
The police do not want to waste their time on the
innocent while the guilty go free to prey on new victims;
the prosecutors realize that highly publicized
exonerations in the cases they should have lost will
later cost them the cases they should win. Maybe
young defense lawyers go to law school with dreams
of defending the innocent, but experienced defense
lawyers see defending an innocent-particularly in an
eyewitness case-as a nightmare. Double-blind,
sequential lineup procedures-ifthey work to keep
the innocent out of the system-are to everyone's
advantage, and they should get a genuine scientific test
for that reason alone.
It is also worth remembering that the question of
eyewitness identification reform is not an all-or-nothing
matter. Sophisticated police departments might, after
testing, decide that some crime situations (for example,
where there is a substantial amount of corroborating
information) call for traditional methods of
identification, while other, shakier, cases call for the
more cautious, conservative double-blind sequential
approach. "Double-blind" administration on its own
(even if "simultaneous") also serves important law
(Doyle, continued on page 31)
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Getting to Truth Before It Falls into
the Hands of the Lawyers: Pursuing
Accuracy in Criminal Cases

envisioned when it began to emphasize 75 years
ago that defense counsel at trial was essential to
getting at the truth.' And the place, they thought,
where truth was to be found was trial where it was
James B. Zagel'
judge and jury, after hearing prosecution and
Societies have always wrestled with the overall defense, not prosecutor, who decided the outcome.
question of the reliability of witnesses and, even now, This reliance on defense counsel to help us get to
when the legal rules are mostly settled, we still worry the truth was a key element in the first cases in which
about perjury, mistakes, delusions and the integrity of the Supreme Court sought to bring constitutional
memory. At issue today is the relatively small subset of regulation to eyewitness identification.'
But defenders are not duty bound to see that the
the witness problem-just that one moment when the
witness points to one person and says that is the per- truth comes out. Ifthe client is guilty they are obliged
son whose conduct I have described. For most witnesses to crime, the phrase "That's the man" is shortest part of the story they offer. Concern about its accuracy has been with us for centuries.
If solutions were easily found, this would not be
an age old concern. Be wary of those who, with
great confidence, offer the miracle cure to a problem
we all recognize. The results of the Illinois doubleblind eyewitness pilot program offer a vivid example
of why what some think obvious is often not so.
There is another point here; failure teaches as much
or more than does success and we ought not to
turn our back on any enterprise that seeks to make
our investigations and adjudications better. The great
value of tests, like the one we discuss herein, is they
keep us from a terrible kind of optimism that, once
disappointed, can lead us to abandoning the search
for something better.
What Is It We Are Trying To Repair and

Why?
Our world of arrest, prosecution and defense has
changed. The idea that truth arises out of trial in an
adversary system is still with us but mostly in theory
not practice. Plea bargains are the dominant mode.

My colleague, Judge Lynch in New York, has
accurately described the process this way:
"[T]he prosecutor ... is the central adjudicator
of facts ... arbiter of ... legal issues and of the
appropriate sentence to be imposed. Potential
defenses are presented by the defendant ... to a
prosecutor, who assesses their factual accuracy and
then decides the charge of which the defendant

should be adjudged guilty..."'
This is a far cry from what the Supreme Court

17 1Public Interest Law Reporter
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It is critical to establish an identification before the eyewitness is subject to outside suggestion and a fhise identification is made. A false identification often has ireversable
consequences.

to use all legally permissible means to see that the
truth does not come out. This became particularly
clear when we thought about what a lawyer should
do at a lineup. Suppose the client tells his lawyer
"Yeah, I stole the stuff but I'm sure no one saw me
inside." Then the lawyer sees his client in a proposed
line-up of seven, six of whom are Hispanic, and his
client is the only blond white man in the group. Does
(Zagel, continued on page 18)
Summer 2006
13

Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4

SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
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counsel want a fairer or more accurate lineup, one
more likely to elicit the truth? If he gets one and the
identification is made, he has deprived his client of
a good argument at trial. What if the police ask the
lawyer for suggestions to improve the lineup and
agree that they will follow these suggestions? Does
the lawyer improve the process to the detriment of
his client? The dilemma here is stark because, unlike
interrogation, the lawyer can not simply advise his
client not to participate in the lineup. The
identification procedure is going to happen. The
lawyer is not authorized to decide simply that it is
right to have a fair identification parade; the lawyer
is only authorized to seek the kind of parade that is
good for the client.
Many eventually accepted this state of affairs
where, in a trial, getting to the truth was not the
single overriding value.' I think they did so for two
reasons. First, the thought was that, in nearly all
cases, the truth came out anyway. Second, there
were important social values found in procedural
fairness and in giving the defendant a meaningful role
in his or her defense. The price of an occasional
criminal going free was thought to be worth paying
to achieve these good things. This tradeoff has
always been controversial. It might not survive a
public referendum.
The tradeoff also rests on premises that
professionals find hard to accept. It is not easy to
find scholars (though not so hard to find judges)
who actually believed that trial was really a good
way to get at the truth in hard cases; the scholarly
defense of the system was based upon its service
to other democratic values. And even where the
adversarial system could work, it was dependent
on having a skilled, adequately funded advocate on
both sides of the case. This last condition was often
unmet.
In the decades that followed the criminal
procedure upheavals of the 1960s, there was a
lukewarm to cool acceptance of the way criminal
cases were handled: lukewarm to cool because we
were in the midst of a rise in crime that lasted for
decades and, only relatively recently, subsided;
accepted because there was much in popular media,
Summer 2006
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shows like NYPD Blue and Law and Order, that
portrayed a system that got the right result. The right
result is the common result, but it is not because of
our system of trials. It is because, in most cases,
there is no serious question of guilt. The evidence is
usually more than good enough and, if it isn't, the
prosecutors frequently won't take a chance on the
case. Perfection is unattainable, but getting it right
in the largest percentage of cases is not good enough
even if that percentage is in the high nineties. The
consequences of error are too grave.
But still we toddled along with what we had. The
volume of criminal cases, which was associated with
the rise in crime and the relatively poorly funded
defense services, led to fewer trials and what Judge
Lynch called an administrative system of criminal
justice. We would be that way today but for recent
events.
The public, as opposed to the defenders of the
world, was generally worried only about the guilty
going free. New science and today's news made
them worry, at least a little, about the innocent being
found guilty.
For this reason the importance of finding the truth
about guilt is valued more highly today than it has
been in many years. We might be in the midst of a
tectonic shift in perspective about crime,
investigation and the accused.
Some of this might seem strange to say to the
public. Haven't we always thought that the end of
the criminal justice system was to find out the truth?
Most people did, but no one who labors in this field
believes that truth is always revealed or acted upon.
There are unjustified convictions and unjustified
acquittals. Even under the better practices that we
will someday have, we will never reach perfection
because the truth is elusive, often beyond the ability
of humans to discover. But we won't stop
prosecuting. Crime has a devastating effect on its
victims and a large effect on the society in which
we live. We have never decided to leave the guilty
or the innocent to the judgment of heaven. We ought
then to do the best we can to lock up all the guilty
and free all the innocent, knowing that we will
sometimes fail.
(Zagel, continued on page 19)
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What Has Led Us to Try Now?
The short answer to this question is that there is no
sudden change, just a gaudy tipping point. The shift to
concern for truth has been building for a while.
Start with Mirandav. Arizona6 and the de-emphasis on admissions of guilt. Mirandacan now be
read as an implied endorsement of the reliability of
eyewitnesses and, perhaps, of the very forensic evidence that is now under attack, say, bite marks, and
even of reliable evidence excludible under the Fourth
Amendment. The Court understood it was holding that
even voluntary confessions, whose truth value was unquestioned, were to be excluded from evidence. This
de-emphasis of truth and re-emphasis on procedural
protections did not last very long. The Supreme Court
limited the scope of Miranda.'The Court (in an opinion written by Justice Thurgood Marshall) also decided to permit the police to use deception to induce
confessions' and narrowed the scope of the exclusionary rules based on the Fourth Amendment.9

'A-

The idea of science in law enforcement is relatively new.
Identification by fingerprinting, br example, was not broadly
accepted in the United States until the 1920s.

evidence because the law permitted anybody to offer
opinion evidence.
Fingerprints are a good example of the early evidence of experts. Fingerprints were used for identification in India in the 1850s.1 o Written work appeared
in 1881 and Galton's book was published in England
in 1892.11 By 1910, fingerprinting itself was in fairly
wide police use. 12 Despite this, it was not until 1911
that a reviewing court approved its use, but broad
acceptance did not come until the 1920s, and it was
not until the 1940s that courts said the prosecution
would no longer have to prove that no two fingerprints are alike.1 3 The course of admission of other
forms of identification evidence was similar. It took
time to get the courts to approve comparative micrography, microanalysis, questioned documents. Most
of the first scientific evidence dealt with traces and
marks which the jurors themselves could perceivefriction ridges, striations on bullets and so forth. As the
twentieth century went on, and science itselfbegan to
deal with things not directly observable, the law began
to take in serology, general chemistry and neutron activation analysis. In all these cases, though, one reason
the courts moved slowly was the resistance of defense counsel to the admission of such evidence because it rarely served any purpose other than to incriminate their clients.
DNA evidence was accepted with amazing speed
precisely because it could exonerate as well as incriminate. There were very few to fight tooth and nail against
its admissibility because the prosecutor or defender
who objected vigorously to DNA evidence knew that,
in the next case, they might be offering that same evidence. DNA, too, came to the courts at a time when
standards of what constituted reliable and valid science had become clearer. DNA analysis had the advantage of service as a tool in many sciences, not merely
criminalistics. The broader use ofDNA analysis meant
the discipline had been critically reviewed by many
more scientists than, say, fingerprints.
It is true that the advent of closerjudicial scrutiny
of expert witnesses in recent years1 4 has called into
question much ofthe science that is offered in the courtroom, but the outcome of disputes about questioned
document examination, serology, fiber analysis,

Despite this renewed endorsement of the value of
confessions, there is no doubt that the Supreme Court,
and every sane person for that matter, would prefer
that guilt be determined by incontestable evidence like
that found three times every week in New York, Miami and Las Vegas by an infallible corps of Crime Scene
Investigators. It is science that created that gaudy tipping point.
The entry of science into the courtroom started at
a very slow pace. Most of the earliest expert testimony from doctors and alienists was admitted into (Zagel, continuedon page 20)
19 | Public Interest Law Reporter
Published by LAW eCommons, 2006

Summer 2006
15

Public Interest Law Reporter, Vol. 11, Iss. 2 [2006], Art. 4

SYMPOSIUM ISSUE
(Zagel, continuedfrom page 19)
(maybe, even fingerprints) are not for today's discussion. DNA survived its first tests and it proved that
there were a small, but nonetheless very meaningful,
number ofwrongful convictions. DNA science teaches
there is, in a certain class of cases, a class of evidence
that, if properly handled, is conclusive. Of course,
properly handled is not inevitable, but it put forth an
implicit message. We can get to the truth better than
we had gotten to it before. And this is why pilot programs are undertaken: not because eyewitnesses can
become the legal equivalent ofrecombinant strands of
DNA, but because DNA showed that we can do better. Obviously only if we try to do better.
There will be attention paid to the causes ofwrongful
convictions, now the predominant element is bad eyewitness identifications. So too, we will look at error
rates in particular kinds of cases." These studies might
help us in our scrutiny of past errors.
Professional investigators of crime have known for
hundreds of years that evidence can lead to the wrong
person, that some eyewitness identifications are worthless, that some confessions are worthless and that some
forensic analyses are worthless. From the perspective
of the police and prosecutors, the solution was either
not to charge in those cases or to drop the charges if
already brought. The defense often proposed this solution. The problem was handled in house and there
was always the final safeguard of the trial.
What DNA told the public is that a trial does not
protect adequately against these errors if the prosecutor decides to go forward with the case. DNA put an
enormous dent into the idea that the adversary system
is the best way to protect against false convictions.
The belief that even good faith errors made earlier in
the process will be detected and repaired as the case
moved through our adversary system has lost some of
its hold on our society. While the adversary system
might serve many social values apart from its detecting the truth of accusations, all these values collectively seem no longer to outweigh the risk of that the
judgments it produces may be untrustworthy. It is not
that these values are to be disregarded, it is the degree
to which they are fostered that is questioned. When a
crime victim sees the perpetrator unjustly acquitted, it
is small consolation to tell them that it is better that ten
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guilty men go free than one innocent man be convicted,
but the society as a whole accepts, or at least understands, this policy. Now the message is, not only do
we let those ten guilty go free by the way, we also
send quite a few innocent men to prison too. That
message is not well received.
So the turn now is to making things right before the
lawyers in the adversary system get their hands on it.
What Can We Expect from Science?
Science proceeds by evaluating ideas, theories,
guesses, conjectures, hopes and dreams. It does this
by experiments of all sorts and observations.
The idea that there is science in law enforcement is
not so old. Early criminology was a form of moral philosophy as in Cesare Beccaria.' 6 One of its first scientists was an anthropologist Cesare Lombroso,17 who
died less than one hundred years ago. Many of his
theses seem laughable today but he used the inductive
method of science as well as he could. Our understanding of criminology is still very much in flux. We
seem to know that more police officers and more
people in prisons are good at reducing crime rates.
Some ofthe standard explanations about strong economies, too many people under thirty, order maintenance
policing, strong gun laws, capital punishment, changing drug habits and markets all remain unproved." But
we are not talking about criminology here, it is
criminalistics or police science which largely concerns
itself with helping to find out, by examination ofphysical objects, who did what, when and how.
In recent times, I have noted, some accepted police science has come under question. This is not
unique to police science. The scientific enterprise is
filled with failure and mistakes. There is a well-known
maxim offered to some first-year medical students
which runs this way: "half ofwhat we teach you will be
wrong, we just don't know which half."
Mistakes in science are not limited to earlier centuries like the phlogistan theory of fire. The theory is a
laughing stock today but it was clever in its time. The
inventor believed there was a combustible substancephlogistan-consumed by combustion which required
air. After the phlogistan was gone the residue weighed
less than the original product as is demonstrated by
the case of ashes which weigh less than the burnt log.
(Zagel, continued on page 32)
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Recent expernents have std ed and compared eyewitness
identification procedures including thc use of moving video
versus photographs, culprit-absent lineups versus culpritpresent lineups, and foil selection by culprit description
versus selection by suspect resemblance.

How can psychological science enhance
the effectiveness of identification
procedures?
An international comparison.
Tim Valentine, Stephen Darling and Amina
Memon'
The sequential double-blind method protects
the guilty, moving video images protect the
innocent (a little), but foil selection strategy

makes no difference.
The reliability of eyewitness identification has
attracted concern from the legal profession in England
for at least 100 years. In 1904 a committee of enquiry
was established to investigate the trials ofAdolf Beck.
Incredibly, on two separate occasions Adolf Beck was
wrongly convicted on the basis of mistaken eyewitness
identification. In both trials, multiple eyewitnesses
identified Beck as a confidence trickster who stole
jewellery from them. The crimes were subsequently
found to have been committed by William Wyatt. The
1904 Committee of enquiry led directly to the
establishment of a Court ofAppeal 2

Devlin report led directly to a landmark judgement in
the English Court of Appeal, which established a
requirement thatin cases ofdisputed identification the
trial judge must caution the jury about the dangers of
eyewitness identification evidence. The judge should
point out that confident eyewitnesses may be mistaken
and instruct the jury to consider carefully the
circumstances of the identification.4
From this historical perspective, it is unsurprising
to learn that mistaken eyewitness identification is also
a major problem for the United States courts.
Nevertheless, the extent of the problem has proved to
be greater than many may have anticipated. The work
of the U.S. Innocence Project, which to date has led

to 183 prisoners being exonerated by new DNA
evidence, found that mistaken eyewitness identification
was a factor contributing to three-quarters ofthe original
wrongful convictions.'
Recent developments to eyewitness identification
procedures
Eyewitness identification procedures used in the
United States and the United Kingdom have some
important differences. In the United States, live lineups
and identification from arrays ofphotographs are both
frequently used to collect formal eyewitness
identification. Traditionally, in the United Kingdom all
formal eyewitness identification evidence has been
obtained from live lineups. Identification from arrays
of photographs has never been permitted as a formal
means of identification. Over the last few years video
has replaced almost all live lineups. This innovation
has been made possible by development of
sophisticated computer systems used to compile video
lineups from a standardised database of moving video
clips.
Recently identification procedures in the United
States have been the subject of consultation with
eyewitness researchers. Identification from arrays of
photographs is still widely used, but the U.S. National
Institute of Justice set up a Technical Working Party
for Eyewitness Evidence to review procedure and
produced a guide to best practice.

Concern about further wrongful convictions based
on mistaken identification led to a government enquiry
into the reliability ofeyewitness identification evidence,

(Valentine, continued on page 22)

chaired by Lord Devlin, which reported in 1976.1 The
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Recent developments to identification
procedures in the USA
The U. S. National Institute of Justice document
Eyewitness identification:A guidefor law
enforcement ("the Guide")6 includes the following
guidance:
* The foils in a lineup should be selected to
generally match the witness' description
of the culprit.
* There should be a minimum of five foils.
* The witness should be advised that the
culprit may or may not be in the lineup.
* The witness should state in their own
words how confident they are of any
identification.
Two methods of lineup presentation are endorsed
by the Guide: 1) a simultaneous lineup, in which the
witness is permitted to inspect all of the photographs
or lineup members before making an identification and
2) a sequentiallineup, in which the witness sees one
photograph or person at a time and makes a decision
prior to viewing any other photograph or person. The
guide does not express any preference for one method
over the other. The procedures mentioned here do
not form an exhaustive list ofthe provisions in the Guide.
It should be noted that the guidance is a
recommendation of best practice and has no direct
legal force.
In an earlier 'white paper,' written under the
auspices of the American Psychology - Law Society
("AP-LS"), psychologists had advocated that the
person who administers a lineup should not know
which person in the lineup is the police suspect. That
is to say that the administrator should be 'blind' to the
identity of the suspect. This procedure is known as
'double-blind' as neither the administrator nor the
witness has prior knowledge of who the suspect is in
the lineup. This measure was strongly advocated by
researchers because it removes all possibility of the
witness being influenced by the lineup administrator.
Such influence can be very subtle and may occur
without any intention or awareness of either the
administrator or the witness. The double-blind
procedure is well established as an important aspect
of scientific enquiry. For example, neither the patient
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nor the clinical staff should know which patients
received a placebo in a drug trial. A recommendation
of the double-blind method is conspicuously absent
from recommended best practice in the Guide on
eyewitness identification.
Research based on identification from photograph
arrays suggests that mistaken identification can be
reduced by sequential presentation ofthe photographs
as outlined in the Guide.9 However, the Guide did not
include the important stipulation of a 'sequential
double-blind method.' Under sequential presentation
instructions the witness should make a decision after
viewing each photograph as to whether he or she is
the culprit. If the witness rejects the photograph they
are shown the next photograph. The procedure stops
when the witness makes an identification. The method
endorsed by researchers crucially stipulates that the
witness should not know how many photographs are
in the lineup, the witness is given unbiased instructions
(e.g., that the person they saw may or may not be in
the lineup) and, importantly, that the administrator is
blind to the identity of the suspect.1 0

Video identification has a number of

important benefits [including]. . . dramatically reduc[ing] the delay before an
identification can be organized, . . . usu-

ally produc[ing] a video lineup within two
hours of request,

...

[has] a large data-

base of video clips from which to select
foils, . . . and [employs] a laptop which
can be taken to a witness who is unable
to attend the police station.

Sequential presentation is believed to reduce
mistaken identification by reducing the opportunity for
the witness to make a relative judgement. In the
traditional simultaneous presentation, a witness who
believes that the culprit is in the lineup may identify the
person who most looks like the person they saw,
having had the opportunity to view all the photographs
in an array. Sequential presentation aims to prevent
relative judgements by forcing the witness to make
(Valentine, continued on page 23)
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independent judgements to each lineup member.
Sequential presentation has been adopted in some
jurisdictions in the United States. However, in some
cases the strict procedure advocated by researchers
has not been followed in all of its aspects. It is worth
noting that researchers did not include sequential
presentation amongst the recommendations ofthe APLS white paper."
Recent developments to identification
procedures in England & Wales
The Police and Criminal Evidence Act of 1984
("PACE") which applies in England and Wales (but
not in Scotland or Northern Ireland), includes a code
of practice for identification by eyewitnesses ("code
D"). The code can be revised without the need for
new primary legislation. In recent years the code has
been revised on an annual basis. The current code of
practice (2005)12 includes the following provisions:
* A lineup that includes one suspect must
consist of at least eight foils.
* The foils must resemble the suspect in age,
general appearance and position in life.
* The suspect has the right for their legal
representative to be present during the
identification procedure.
* The person who administers the lineup
cannot be involved in the investigation of
the case (but note that the administrator
does know who the suspect is).
* Witnesses must be advised that the person
they saw may or may not be present.
* Witnesses must be advised that if they
cannot make a positive identification they
should say so.
* Witnesses must view each member of the
lineup twice before making any
identification.
* Video identification should be used unless
there is a reason why a live identification
is more appropriate.
Although the code of practice does not have
statutory force, trial judges have the discretion to
exclude or allow eyewitness identification evidence.

Therefore police forces have systems in place to
demonstrate compliance with the code.
Two different IT systems are in widespread use in
British police forces to provide video identification.
VIPERTM (Video Identification Procedure Electronic
Recording) and PROMAF" (Profile Matching)." The
systems produce similar formats of video lineup, but
each has its own database of images. Lineups consist
of 15 second clips of each person shown one after
another. The sequence starts with a head and shoulders
shot of the person looking directly at the camera, who
slowly turns their head to present a full right profile to
the camera. The person then slowly rotates their head
to present a full left profile to the camera. Finally the
person returns to looking directly into the camera in a
full-face pose.
Research on video identification
Research has demonstrated that VIPER video
lineups from real criminal cases were fairer to the
suspects than conventional 'live' lineups,14 and that
VIPER video lineups were equally fair to white
European and African-Caribbean suspects.I In these
studies, participants (known as 'mock witnesses') were
shown a set of videos of VIPER lineups or a set of
photographs of live lineups held as part of the
investigation of the case. For each lineup they were
given the first description of the offender made by the
original witness. The mock witnesses were required
to choose, on the basis of the witness' description, the
lineup member who they think is most likely to be the
police suspect. Therefore, a 'mock witness' simulates
a witness who (a) has no memory of the culprit at the
time ofthe identification procedure; (b) can remember
the description they previously gave to the police and
(c) nevertheless, makes an identification from the lineup.
If the lineup is perfectly fair, and all members fit the
description, the mock witness would have no basis on
which to make their selection and would merely have
to guess who is the suspect. Therefore, if a large
number of the mock witnesses are asked to make a
selection they would select the suspect on 11 percent
of occasions (1 in 9) from each lineup, because the
lineups all contained a suspect and eight foils.

I (Valentine, continuedon page 24)
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